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THE LAWYER AS CATALYST OF SOCIAL 
CHANGE 
James E. Moliterno* 
INTRODUCTION 
Elsewhere I have said that lawyers may have an important disadvantage 
in the role of public official.' But as challengers to perceived injustice, as 
catalysts of social change, lawyers may have a special role advantage.2 
Undoubtedly, it seems, this is one of the lawyer's roles in a modem 
democratic society, be it a well-established one or an emerging one. 
There is a difference in training and mindset between common-law and 
civil-law lawyers in this regard.3 Common-law lawyers recognize that their 
work in court helps shape the law. Every argument they make that is 
accepted by a court makes a bit of precedent. It makes law. In routine 
cases, just a bit; in cases of wider application, a great deal. Civil-law 
lawyers, by contrast, think of their court work as the application of existing 
law, not law making. The code and parliament are supreme, and decisions 
of courts make no law beyond the parties. As a result, common-law 
lawyers think differently from civil law lawyers. Common-law lawyers are 
participants in law making. We think of the great social change cases, the 
Brown v. Boards4 and the Roe v. Wades5 and the Gideon v. Wainwrights6 
and so on, as being attributable to both the deciding courts and the winning 
parties' lawyers. Common-law lawyers understand that their arguments 
* Tazewell Taylor Professor of Law, College of William & Mary. Excellent research 
assistance with this essay was provided by Benjamin Novak, Daniel Izzo, Colleen Loughran, 
and Daniel Matthews. Thanks to Stephen Wizner, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aziz Rana, 
Bruce Green, Russell Pearce, Neta Ziv, Martin Bohmer, Deborah Rhode, and Susan Carle 
for their questions and comments on the presentation of this essay. 
I. James E. Moliterno, A Golden Age of Civic Involvement: The Client Centered 
Disadvantage for Lawyers Acting as Public Officials, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 
2009) (on file with author). 
2. I do not mean to suggest that lawyers have an advantage in this role over all others. 
History shows that professors of a wide range of religious beliefs may also have special 
advantages. Lawyers, the religious, and perhaps some other groups possess different 
advantages for this work. 
3. A narrower distinction may really be between lawyers in systems with judicial 
supremacy and those in systems with parliamentary supremacy. For purposes of this essay, 
the common law/civil law dichotomy sufficiently highlights the distinction. 
4. Brown v. Board ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
5. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
6. 372 u.s. 335 (1963). 
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make law, and in some cases, social change. Rare is the U.S. law school 
dean's welcoming speech or the J.D. commencement address that does not 
include a stirring, evocative plea to the new members of the common-law 
legal profession to change the world.7 In common-law systems, even 
typical lawyers have a direct line to change through law making. Common-
law lawyers correctly perceive themselves as potential agents of social 
change. 
Consider N. Hill, a common-law lawyer who changed the course of 
consumer protection. Who, you ask? Perhaps a protege of Ralph Nader. 
Not quite. More of a precursor than a protege. Hill's client came to him 
having taken a drug that had been mislabeled, and she was injured by taking 
the drug.8 However, because the druggist had not failed in the exercise of 
due care, Hill did not bring an action against that person. 9 Instead, he 
brought an action against the drug bottler, claiming he had done so 
carelessly. But when Hill met his new client, it was 1849 and the clear rule 
of law imposed no duty on a remote maker or vendor of a product to protect 
an eventual consumer ofthe product such as Hill's client. 10 Hill, however, 
won his case for his injured client because the state's highest court created a 
modest exception to the general privity of contract rule for cases in which 
the injury was caused by a product that was a thing of danger. 11 This was a 
narrow exception. Courts for the next sixty-plus years struggled with what 
would be a dangerous instrumentality fitting within the rule's exception, 
until Benjamin Cardozo clarified that the exception was no exception at all, 
but was actually the creation of a tort duty "when the consequences of 
negligence may be foreseen." 12 No longer would the liability of remote 
vendors be confined to things of danger. Instead, Buicks and other products 
that caused injuries would produce a duty on the part of their makers and 
sellers when the danger was reasonably foreseeable. 
But look back to what Hill had said sixty-plus years before on behalf of 
his drug-injured client. He asked the court to create liability without regard 
to privity of contract when the harmful "consequences of the act ... would 
be likely to follow and might be easily foreseen." 13 He suggested that this 
liability would be confined to those cases in which the "consequences 
[were] so proximate as to be expected or readily foreseen." 14 
What an amazing lawyer. He "got it" almost seventy years before 
Cardozo explained it. By doing nothing more than representing his client in 
a routine product injury case, he charted a course, a long one, toward a new 
7. See two examples excerpted in JAMES E. MOLITERNO & FREDERIC I. LEDERER, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LAW, LAW STUDY, AND THE LAWYER'S ROLE 4-11 (2d ed. 2004). 
8. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 396,396-97 (1852). 
9. /d. 
I 0. /d. at 407-08. 
II. /d. at410-11. 
12. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Ill N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916). 
13. Thomas, 6 N.Y. at 402 (emphasis omitted). 
14. /d. (emphasis omitted). 
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level of consumer protection. He changed the law. He changed the course 
of consumer protection. He changed the way makers and sellers would 
behave. He made social change within the role of lawyer as common-law 
lawyers do. 
But this essay is not about Hill or Thurgood Marshall, or Catherine 
MacKinnon or Richard Posner or Louis Brandeis, or countless other 
lawyers famous and not, who have made enormous social change through 
their law work. These law giants made their social change through 
litigation, proposal of new legislation, and creating new modes of legal 
analysis-all fairly traditional lawyer role activities (even if their mode of 
performing those traditional tasks broke contemporary molds). This essay 
is about law-trained people who have been social change forces through 
methods of the social activist and not exclusively of the lawyer. The 
Naders and Gandhis, the lawyers in Pakistan who marched against the 
suspension of the courts by General Pervez Musharraf in 2007, or those 
who entered the election board to demand publication of vote results from 
Robert Mugabe's government in 2008. Are lawyers especially well-suited 
to act in these outside-the-traditional-lawyer-role, social change modes? 
Obviously, lawyers, and especially common-law lawyers, are powerfully 
positioned to be agents of social change. At the center of the traditional 
lawyer role, representing clients in courts, lawyers are given a monopoly on 
the enterprise by unauthorized practice of law (UPL) laws. But might the 
same lawyer qualities, natures, and tendencies also distinguish lawyers as 
agents of social change outside the traditional lawyer role? That is the topic 
ofthis essay. 
I. THE LAWYER: A PUBLIC OFFICIAL WEAKNESS 
Elsewhere, I have suggested that the lawyer's role is not well-suited to 
being a lawmaker or public officiai. 15 Lawyers do have many skills that 
lend themselves to the public official role, but skills and talents aside, the 
lawyer's role is a poor fit with that of the public official. The lawyer's 
work and training are client-centered. Client goals are paramount, with 
only modest constraints imposed by the countervailing interests of others or 
the public generally. Not so the public official, who is a specially 
empowered good citizen, one who places the public interest first. 
Within only very loose constraints, lawyers seek the private good of their 
clients and disregard the interests of the public. That is our role. If our 
client wants something lawful that harms another, even that does injustice 
to another, we seek our client's goal. If our client wants something lawful 
that harms the public good, we seek our client's goal. The lawyer is not 
generally a broad, public-good seeker. Only in gross instances of harm to 
the public good is the lawyer permitted under ethical norms to betray her 
client's interests (revealing information to prevent very serious future harm, 
15. Molitemo, supra note 1. 
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for example). Our ethical norms and the lawyer's accepted, modem role 
exalt advancing client goals to the detriment of others. 
This is mere description and, in this essay's context, no criticism of 
lawyers. This is what lawyers do. In some measure, it is what lawyers 
have done for centuries, 16 although the client-centered role may only have 
been the dominant one for the past fifty years. It is what makes lawyers 
lawyers, and what makes lawyers useful. We advance our clients' good 
over that of others, even when the result might be unjust, and we advance 
our clients' good over the public good except in rare and extreme instances. 
This one central aspect of the lawyer role, the lawyer ethos, may be a 
terrible disadvantage to the lawyer's capacity to do public office effectively. 
Lawyers advance the interests of clients for a fee, and, within very broad 
ranges, lawyers represent the interests of clients, without regard for the 
public good or the legitimate competing interests of others or the public 
generally. It is no shame on a lawyer to represent the interests of a client 
effectively and to undermine the interests of others for the gain of their 
client. That is the perfectly legitimate role of the lawyer in representation. 
No one questions the propriety of a lawyer who advances her client's 
interests at the expense of others. While this role may be a poor fit with a 
public official's, it fits hand in glove with the attributes of social change 
agent. 
What is the role of lawyer then? 
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all 
the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means 
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among 
them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he 
must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may 
bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an 
advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though it should be his 
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.I7 
Henry Lord Brougham's classic rendition of the lawyer's advocacy role 
is surely overstated and subject to exception and criticism. It has more 
often been criticized than praised by academic writers. But nonetheless, 
even discounted for its exaggeration, it makes clear that lawyers are 
primarily interested in advancing their clients' lawful aims, and all other 
interests are a distant second. 18 Brougham's zealous approach to advocacy 
16. See Joseph G. Baldwin, The Bench and the Bar, reprinted in READINGS IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 113 (Dennis R. Nolan ed., 1980). 
17. TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE: PART II, at 3 (New York, James Cockcroft & Co. 1874); 
see also Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, "Anything Rather Than a Deliberate and 
Well-Considered Opinion "-Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1221, 1221 (2006). 
18. See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy 
Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. I, 2-3 (2005) (observing that Brougham's 1820 declaration 
"that 'an advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and 
that person is his client'. . . . remains emblematic of a conception that is arguably the 
'dominant' one among United States lawyers"). 
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served him well in a role he embraced outside the ordinary lawyer's role of 
representing clients. Brougham was himself an active and effective social 
change agent.I9 
More modernly, we have rules that permit a lawyer to withdraw when the 
client's course is highly repugnant (this rule does not require it, and the 
rationale for this rule is as much to ensure the client will get a lawyer who 
can advance his interests with zeal rather than one who is conflicted about 
the representation).2o 
A more tailored than Brougham's, but nonetheless strong statement of 
the lawyer's client-centered duty was given by former American Bar 
Association (ABA) President, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Writing in the 
case that at long last struck down citizenship requirements as a lawyer 
qualification, he said, 
Lawyers frequently represent foreign countries and the nationals of 
such countries in litigation in the courts of the United States, as well as in 
other matters in this country. In such representation, the duty of the 
lawyer, subject to his role as an "officer of the court," is to further the 
interests of his clients by all lawful means, even when those interests are 
in conflict with the interests of the United States or of a State. But this 
representation involves no conflict of interest in the invidious sense. 
Rather, it casts the lawyer in his honored and traditional role as an 
authorized but independent agent acting to vindicate the legal rights of a 
client, whoever it may be.21 
Justice Powell is no Lord Brougham. He might not agree with 
Brougham's extreme view of the lawyer properly pursuing a client's ends to 
the extent of "involving his country in confusion";22 but Powell regards a 
lawyer representing a client to the harm of his own country as being "in his 
honored and traditional role."23 
Despite talk of public service obligations, the organized bar has never 
embraced an ethic of more-than-optional public service for lawyers.24 
Neither has it embraced justice as a lawyer's primary goal, despite William 
Simon's persuasive argument that it is the lawyer's primary goaJ.25 The 
legal profession was embarrassed by Monroe Freedman's candor when he 
asserted that the criminal defense lawyer's duty was to argue even false 
19. Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham-Advocating at the Edge for Human 
Rights, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 311 (2007) (recounting many of Brougham's social change 
missions, especially his antislavery work). 
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b )( 4) (2008). 
21. In reGriffiths, 413 U.S. 717,724 n.l4 (1973). 
22. TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE, supra note 17, at 3. 
23. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 724 n.4. 
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2008); B. George Ballman, Jr., Amended 
Rule 6.I: Another Move Towards Mandatory Pro Bono? Is That What We Want?, 7 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1139, 1141-46 (1994). 
25. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 
2 (1998). 
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inferences for his client.26 But Freedman and Simon both described what 
they saw: a profession whose members were animated by the adversary 
excuse and their role as partisans. 
Perhaps no more lasting description of the lawyer's role exists than 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's "The Path of the Law."27 In this speech, 
Holmes explains that a lawyer sells her ability to predict the consequences 
of proposed and past conduct by the client, Holmes's "bad man."28 The bad 
man, every lawyer's client for Holmes, cares nothing of the consequences 
of his actions to the public good, but only of the consequences he will likely 
reap at the hands of public officials.29 The lawyer's role for Holmes is to 
provide expert predictions of those consequences, and not to decline to 
serve the client if the client's actions will harm others or the public30 but 
rather to guide the client in his evaluation of the personal consequences of 
his actions, consequences imposed by public officials either in the form of 
prosecution or by courts as a result of private litigation.31 
Holmes taught us that lawyers represent "the bad man,"32 or one who 
cares only for his own good and the consequences that may be taken by 
public agencies (criminal prosecution, administrative consequences, or 
orders of court at the instance of private plaintiffs) as a result of his actions. 
Lawyers, Holmes said, do not calculate the niceties of justice or the public 
interest against those of the client.33 Rather, Holmes said essentially that 
lawyers sell their expertise and judgment about official consequences to 
their clients. 34 
Lawyers are partisans. There is nothing shameful in that. It is what 
makes lawyers lawyers in some sense. A lawyer's role is to advance the 
lawful interests of her client, without regard for whether those interests 
harm the interest of others (they most often do), nor whether those interests 
are at odds with more general notions of the public's interest. 
Good lawyers are partisans in this sense. This is not an attribute from 
which professional (as opposed to popular) approbation comes. It is what 
distinguishes lawyers, especially American lawyers. In our adversarial 
justice system, despite contrary-sounding happy talk in bar function after-
26. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: 
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1475 (1966); see also William H. 
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. 
L. REV. 29, 30-34; William H. Simon, "Thinking Like a Lawyer"' About Ethical Questions, 
27 HOFSTRA L. REV. I, 2 (I 998) (asserting that, while Freedman "was insistent on 
confronting hard questions, he also was emphatic in affirming simple answers"). 
27. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,461 (1897). 
28. !d. 
29. !d. 
30. !d. 
31. David Luban's "morally activist lawyer" stands in perhaps the starkest contract to 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's description. See DAVID LUBAN, LA YWERS AND JUSTICE: AN 
ETHICAL STUDY, at xxii ( 1988). 
32. Holmes, supra note 27, at 461. 
33. !d. at 460-61. 
34. !d. at 461-62. 
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dinner speeches, the lawyer's proper role is to advocate for her client while 
the other party's lawyer advocates for hers, all before an umpirial judge. 
Whether we are correct or not, our justice system operates on the premise 
that pitting sides against one another produces justice. This believed-in 
result is what we rely on in describing a lawyer's role morality. The lawyer 
who properly plays her role within a moral system is moral, even if 
particular acts might offend notions of general morality. 
Of course the lawyer's pursuit of client aims has limits. The goals sought 
and the means undertaken must themselves be lawful. At least they must be 
supported by nonfrivolous arguments. We do not require the lawyer to 
objectively or subjectively believe that the client's positions will prevail. 
We ask only that the lawyer have nonfrivolous support.35 
The lawyer's role does permit a lawyer to withdraw from representing a 
client when the client's goals are repulsive to the lawyer,36 and generally 
insulates the lawyer from a requirement of agreeing with a client's political, 
social, or moral views or activities.37 But we counsel lawyers not to take 
such a position lightly, and we base our support for that "limit" as much on 
the worry that a client will not receive adequate representation from a 
repulsed lawyer.38 Instead, we take professional pride in the lawyer who 
represents the unpopular client without regard to the lawyer's own views.39 
The profession prides itself on the ethic of separation from a client's moral 
position. So this "limit" is hardly one at all. 
Even in the "kinder, gentler" world of the transactional lawyer, lawyers 
are meant to take sides. In this setting, they may often represent clients 
whose interests may be served by compromise and accommodations, but 
even the extensive literature on cooperative negotiation emphasizes that it is 
the client's interests that must be faithfully pursued.40 The creative, 
cooperative lawyer may find that her client's interests can be advanced 
while another party's interests are advanced as well, but that creative lawyer 
is not motivated by a desire or duty to advance another's interests. It is 
only when this alignment advances the client's interests that pursuing it is 
desirable. And where the interests of the client part from another's 
interests, the lawyer invariably and properly becomes a distributive 
35. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2008). 
36. /d. R. 1.16(b)(4). 
37. !d. R. 1.2(b ). 
38. Charles W. Wolfram, A Lawyer's Duty to Represent Clients, Repugnant and 
Otherwise, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 214, 215-35 
(David Luban ed., 1983). 
39. Witness the legion of books telling Clarence Darrow's storied career, for example, 
ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED: CLARENCE DARROW IN THE COURTROOM (Arthur Weinberg 
ed., 1989). For general support of this proposition, see Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: 
The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. I 060, I 066 (1976). 
40. See generally John Lande, Principles for Policymaking About Collaborative Law 
and Other ADR Processes, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 619 (2007); Ted Schneyer, The 
Organized Bar and the Collaborative Bar Movement: A Study in Professional Change, 50 
ARIZ. L. REV. 289 (2008). 
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bargainer, extracting a dollar for her client from her bargaining opponent's 
client.41 As they should, lawyers advance the only loosely limited interests 
of their clients, not the interests of justice nor the public interests. 
As a public official, the public interest is supreme. "[L]egislators must 
be genuinely oriented toward enacting laws that are in the common good or 
public interest .... "42 The public official's role is that of an exalted citizen 
with special public authority, one who puts the public's interest first and 
who possesses the power to execute on that priority. To the extent that, as a 
lawyer, a public official might favor the interests of the lawyer-officials or 
former clients, or expected future clients, or the clients of the lawyer's 
former law firm, that lawyer would be acting as a lawyer at the expense of 
the proper service as a public official. 
II. WHAT MAKES AN EFFECTIVE SOCIAL CHANGE AGENT? 
Social movement leaders are "strategic decision-makers who inspire and 
organize others to participate in social movements."43 Theorists have 
expounded different approaches to explaining leadership in social 
movements. For instance, one theory focuses on the double role of social 
movement leaders; that a leader must "function both within the movement 
as a 'mobilizer,' inspiring participants," and "outside the movement as an 
'articulator,' linking the movement to the larger society."44 The lawyer's 
forensic skills and role in representing client interests seem naturally 
associated with the role as an articulator. Another theory of leadership 
contends that leaders attain authority because "followers willingly cede 
agency to their leaders."45 
Collective behavior theorists contend that leaders "create the impetus for 
movements by providing examples of action, directing action, and defining 
problems and proposing solutions."46 Lawyers are regularly expected to 
define the problem, consider solutions, and provide strategies for action. 
Simple characteristics of successful leaders match those of lawyers. 
Social movement leaders tend to be "highly educated."47 Social movement 
leaders also generally "come from the educated middle and upper classes," 
41. ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING 
IN41-55(2ded. 1991). 
42. Adrian Vermeu1e, Instrumentalisms, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2113, 2127 (2007) (book 
review) (quoting BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE 
OF LAW 250 (2006)). 
43. A1don D. Morris & Suzanne Staggenborg, Leadership in Social Movements, in THE 
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 171, 171 (David A. Snow et al. eds., 2004). 
44. /d. at 172 (quoting Joseph R. Gusfield, Functional Areas of Leadership in Social 
Movements, 7 Soc. Q. 137, 140 (1966)). 
45. !d. (citing ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE 
OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY ( 1962)). 
46. /d. at 173 (citing KURT LANG & GLADYS ENGEL LANG, COLLECTIVE DYNAMICS 
(1961)). 
47. /d. at 174. 
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a quality nonrepresentative of the usual movement base.48 This quality is 
partially due to the fact that "privileged class backgrounds provide leaders 
with financial resources, flexible schedules and social contacts often 
unavailable" to the majority.49 But it is education that is "the key resource 
that social movement leaders derive from their . . . backgrounds," and 
"educational capital is crucial" even for those leaders who come from the 
poor and working-class community. so 
Social movement leaders tend to be highly educated because this is 
necessary to perform the "myriad of intellectual tasks" required for 
success. 51 Such a wide range of tasks parallels those performed by lawyers, 
as does the flexibility of mind for which legal education is well-known 
training; specifically, social movement leaders frame grievances and 
formulate ideologies, debate, interface with media, write, orate, devise 
strategies, and engage in dialogue with internal and external elites. 52 
Through formal and advanced education, such as law school, social leaders 
acquire advanced "reading, writing, speaking and analytical skills" 
necessary for such tasks.53 Social movement leaders "tend to major in 
social sciences, humanities and arts," which are "highly relevant" because 
they "constitute a 'science of human action."54 
How do social change agents generate change and what is necessary for a 
social movement to emerge and succeed? The "key ingredients for the 
emergence of social movements . . . includ[ e] political and cultural 
opportunities, organizational bases, material and human resources, 
precipitating events, threats, grievances, and collective action frames," and 
leaders are instrumental in converting these "conditions for mobilization 
into actual social movements."55 For instance, leaders must be able to 
utilize "preexisting bases" and to recognize "political and cultural 
opportunities."56 Take Mahatma Gandhi's initial days in South Africa as an 
example. In the beginning, Gandhi used the infrastructure of British 
government and the Indian Congress as a base when he initiated the Natal 
Indian Congress as the focal point of the Indian rights movement. 
Moreover, he used the opportunity of the disenfranchisement bill to unite 
and motivate the Indians in South Africa to act, whether they were Muslim, 
Hindu, or Christian. 
48. !d. (citing CRANE BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION (1952); RICHARD 
FLACKS, YOUTH AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1971 ); ANTHONY 0BERSCHALL, SOCIAL CONFLICT AND 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (1973)). 
49. !d. at 175. 
50. !d. 
51. !d. 
52. !d. 
53. !d. 
54. !d. (citations omitted). 
55. !d. at 178. 
56. !d. 
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Leaders must "offer frames, tactics, and organizational vehicles" in order 
to mobilize action. 57 Framing resonates with the methods by which lawyers 
organize and present an argument; particularly, "[f]raming specifies the 
unjust conditions," or lists the grievances, and then determines "appropriate 
strategies and tactics to achieve the desired ends."58 
Ill. THE GOOD FIT BETWEEN THE LAWYER'S ROLE AND THAT OF SOCIAL 
CHANGE AGENT 
All of the attributes of the lawyer that we have been told for centuries 
make them good public servants also make them good social changers. 
Leadership qualities, forensic ability, talent for reasoning, knowledge of the 
legal system-all of these aid the work of the social changer. 
But the same role attributes that seem to disadvantage lawyers in the 
public official role may distinguish them in being catalysts for social 
change. The social changer's single-minded pursuit of a goal fits the 
lawyer's training and temperament. We think of social changers as 
advancing the public interest, but in truth, we think this when we happen to 
agree with the social changer's view of the public good. Social changers 
pursue a cause, which may advance the public good or not. Surely the 
social changer believes what she does advances the public good, but it is the 
cause and her belief in it that counts to the social changer and the varying 
views of its public good are left for history to evaluate. I use three 
examples of law-trained social change agents in this essay: Gandhi, Ralph 
Nader, and Phyllis Schlafly. I doubt that many readers would agree that the 
results of all three of these social change agents advanced the public 
interest. Being viewed as advancing the public interest is not the goal of a 
social change agent. Nor is it the goal of a lawyer advocating for a client. 
A. Criticisms of Social Change Agents 
Contemporaneous critics of social change agents are not hard to find. 
But such critics do not deter the social change agent any more than they 
deter a lawyer's advocacy. The British authorities in India articulated an 
argument that Gandhi's efforts were contrary to the public's interest in 
stability and order and the British view of civilized rule. Nader's attacks on 
business could be argued to have diminished American business's 
competitive advantages, costing jobs and creating havoc in abandoned 
factory towns from which business departed for less regulated climes. 
Nader and his views were the targets of significant criticisms from car 
manufacturers, business leaders, economists, and others. The criticisms 
included economic concerns, such as the claim that cars like the Corvair 
could not have these safety problems, because the insurance companies 
57. /d. at 180. 
58. /d. at 183. 
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would not permit it. 59 Auto industry leaders such as Henry Ford II asserted 
that the industry had "always built cars just as safe as they possibly can 
be."60 Ford further cautioned that the federal government should "consider 
carefully the problems they would pass along to the auto industry if they 
passed an irrational law which conceivably could upset the economy of the 
country."61 Like Ford, Frederic G. Donner, the then-chairman of General 
Motors (GM) described Nader's criticisms of the Corvair as "unreasonable" 
and reminded audiences "that laws establishing standards would not in 
themselves solve the problem."62 
Political and other business leaders also criticized Nader. For example, 
Michigan Governor George Romney argued that the prosperity of the 
country was closely linked with that of the auto industry.63 William 
Murphy, chairman of the Business Council, opined that "[t]his country is on 
a safety kick. It is a fad, on the order of the Hula Hoop. We are going 
through a cycle of over-emphasis on safety."64 
One economist, Roger Leroy Miller, leveled a variety of criticisms at 
Nader and other safety advocates.65 Among other critiques, Miller pointed 
out that the inevitable result of increased safety requirements would be 
higher car prices.66 Miller argued that as the price of new cars would rise, 
the demand for used cars would also rise, leading to an increased number of 
used cars on the road. 67 Those used cars will lack the new safety features, 
and, as a result, "[t]he increase in the age of cars being driven may decrease 
safety as much as new-car safety features increase it."68 Miller also 
asserted that there were less costly ways for society to increase road safety 
than new safety features on cars, for example, "[m]odification or removal of 
roadside hazards."69 Pointing toward the high proportion of fatal accidents 
caused by drunken drivers, Miller queried "[ w ]hy should the many who 
seek to purchase the services of automobile transportation end up paying for 
increased safety in order to prevent fatalities involving the few drunken 
drivers?"70 
59. Safety: Critic Raps Foreign Cars, Too, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1966, at J4. 
60. !d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
61. /d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
62. David W. Chute, GM Advances Introduction of '67 Models to Help Sales, WASH. 
PosT, May 21, 1966, at E6 (quoting G.M. Board Chairman Frederic G. Donner) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
63. Ford Lashes Unsafe-Auto Allegations, WASH. POST., Apr. 16, 1966, at AI. 
64. One Book that Shook the Business World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1970, at 244 (quoting 
William Murphy) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
65. See Roger Leroy Miller, The Economic and Social Hazards of Improving Auto 
Safety, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1974, at 13. 
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67. /d. 
68. /d. 
69. /d. 
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In Regulation and the Natural Progress of Opulence,1 1 Sam Peltzman 
describes what is now called the "Peltzman Effect." Peltzman criticizes 
Nader's advocacy of increased safety standards for motor vehicles as being 
counterproductive. Peltzman noted that before the Department of 
Transportation created the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA), which in turn created the Motor Vehicle Safety Standards 
(MVSS), the rate of traffic fatalities was already decreasing.72 
Peltzman argued that Nader had in fact created a more dangerous 
environment. The claim was that the increased safety standards to which 
cars are built would instill drivers with a false sense of securityJ3 Rather 
than driving more safely, motorists would feel "the car will save me" and 
engage in increasingly risky behavior. Peltzman argued that higher 
standards would actually increase traffic accidents and fatalities as people 
rely more and more on the car and less on driving behavior. 
Similarly, it is often wondered why Gandhi, considered by many to be 
the "strongest symbol of non-violence in the 20th century," never received 
the Nobel Peace Prize. 74 Among the criticisms that some members of the 
Nobel Committee raised about Gandhi was that he Was not consistently a 
pacifist.75 Gandhi had, at times, suggested that "if there was no other way 
of securing justice from Pakistan and if Pakistan persistently refused to see 
its proved error and continued to minimise it, the Indian Union Government 
would have to go to war against it."76 Although Gandhi was quick to note 
that if the Indian government took that course, then he would not himself 
have a place in that "new order," some still criticized these sorts of 
statements as dangerous and inconsistent with his stated principles. 77 In 
addition, some on the Nobel Committee were worried that not only was 
Gandhi an inconsistent pacifist, but that he also should have known that 
some of the campaigns he spearheaded stood a real possibility of 
"degenerat[ing] into violence and terror."78 Some on the Nobel Committee 
also were critical of Gandhi's nationalist tendencies, noting that all of 
Gandhi's "struggle in South Africa was on behalf of the Indians only, and 
not of the blacks whose living conditions were even worse."79 One member 
of the Nobel Committee noted in his diary that while Gandhi "is the greatest 
personality among the nominees-plenty of good things could be said about 
him-we should remember that he is not only an apostle for peace; he is 
first and foremost a patriot,"80 a serious criticism in the Nobel context. 
71. SAM PELTZMAN, REGULATION AND THE NATURAL PROGRESS OF OPULENCE (2005). 
72. /d. at 7-8. 
73. !d. at 6. 
74. 0yvind Tennesson, Mahatma Gandhi, the Missing Laureate, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, Dec. 
I, 1999, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/articles/gandhi/index.html. 
75. !d. 
76. /d. 
77. !d. 
78. !d. 
79. /d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
80. !d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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There were other criticisms of Gandhi, some of which are rendered in the 
book, Gandhi and His Critics.81 One criticism of Gandhi was that he was 
an "apologist for the caste system."82 This was a criticism often leveled by 
the British to undermine Gandhi based on Gandhi's opposition to an 
affirmative-action-like plan in 1932. Gandhi's opposition to this plan was 
based on its attempt to set up separate electorates for the lower classes. 
Interestingly, Gandhi was accused by Hindu leaders of being too 
concerned with the plight of the lower classes. So, in this case, Gandhi was 
criticized from two sides at once. Gandhi was very critical of the treatment 
of the lower classes. In this, Gandhi broke with Hindu tradition and 
angered many traditional Hindus.83 Gandhi became consistently more 
critical of the caste system as time went on. He moved from agreeing with 
it in principle, to wanting to simplify it and get rid of the numerous 
subcastes, to finally advocating wholesale abolishment of it. 84 
Gandhi was also criticized for being disingenuous regarding race 
discrimination. Proponents of this claim usually point to Gandhi's time in 
South Africa. The argument is that, since Gandhi did not take up the cause 
of the black population during this period, he was not really against racism 
in general. 85 It should not be surprising that Gandhi focused his efforts on 
racism against Indians. Given the immense challenge of fighting racism at 
all in the early 1900s, Gandhi chose to limit his efforts. Gandhi attempted 
to fight the battle in which he had a chance of success. Evidence does show 
that later movements against racism in a more general sense received 
inspiration and encouragement from Gandhi's early, more limited efforts.86 
But he was nonetheless subject to this claim that he was not acting in the 
public interests during his work in South Africa. 
Gandhi's stance regarding the partition of India has also received 
criticism. Gandhi did not believe in the partition. Gandhi believed that 
India had worked hard for centuries to unify both Hindus and Muslims and 
that the partition would nullify all this work. Gandhi and his Indian 
National Congress took insufficient steps to assuage Muslim fears of 
repression in a unified India, and the remarks of some Hindus likely fueled 
those fears.87 To the critics this is the key failure; Gandhi opposed the two-
nation solution without articulating a way in which a single nation could 
work. 
Gandhi even said, "I know no non-violent method of compelling the 
obedience of eight crores of Muslims to the will of the rest of India, 
however powerful a majority the rest may represent."88 Statements like this 
81. 8. R. NANDA, GANDHI AND HIS CRITICS (1985). 
82. /d. at 18. 
83. !d. at 18-26. 
84. !d. at 26. 
85. !d. at 27. 
86. !d. at 31. 
87. !d. at 85, 93-95. 
88. /d. at 94. 
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frightened Muslims and increased tensions. Gandhi's advocacy of majority 
rule and democracy inflamed Muslim fears. 
Gandhi's commitment to nonviolence produced claims that he was a 
fascist sympathizer and thus acting counter to the public interest. 
According to the critics, Gandhi was in no way nonviolent until he was 
about fifty. Gandhi did have a military record, serving in the Zulu 
rebellion, Boer War, and World War I. Critics point to this as evidence that 
Gandhi was in no way committed to nonviolence. Some of these same 
critics, however, point to Gandhi's "Quit India" movement in 1942 as 
evidence that he was blinded by nonviolence and even accuse him of fascist 
sympathies because he would not condone violence against Axis powers. 89 
Rather than see his development toward nonviolence as a progression of life 
views, critics claimed he was either blinded by ideology or must be 
sympathizing with the Nazis. 
Recognizing the capacity to argue about the public good served by social 
changers' efforts does not diminish their efforts any more than arguments 
about the value of a client's identified good diminish his lawyer's efforts on 
behalf of that client. Each pursues the goal without regard to others' doubts 
about the goal's value. It is enough that the social changer believes in the 
goal. The lawyer need not even believe in the client's good, but need only 
be able to say that it is not an unlawful goal, nor one within the very narrow 
range of goals that so impinges the safety or well-being of others to be 
outside the wide range of proper targets of a lawyer's efforts. 
Perhaps few would agree that the public good was advanced by goals 
sought by all three social change agents used as examples in this essay. But 
that is the lot of lawyers: they advance goals of clients with only modest 
regard for public good and even more modest concern about the opinion of 
others regarding the value of the goals they seek. 
In one respect, the social change agent might be seen as a poor fit with 
the role of lawyer, but this objection would be overblown. Lawyers are not 
responsible for the moral positions of their clients, and indeed, lawyers are 
protected from connection to their clients by the rules and norms of the 
legal profession.90 Obviously social change agents are connected to the 
moral positions of their clients. But although lawyers are protected from 
sharing the goals and attributes of their clients, nothing in the rules and 
norms of the legal profession requires them to be so separated. Cause 
lawyers are explicitly connected to their clients, seeking as they do clients 
who could represent the very goals the cause lawyers wish to advance. And 
probably far more lawyers than cause lawyers eventually settle into law 
practices in which they share the goals of their clients.91 Whether the 
lawyers initially share the clients' goals or learn to love them does not 
89. !d. at 115. 
90. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2008). 
91. Stuart A. Scheingold, Essay for the In-Print Symposium on The Myth of Moral 
Justice, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 47, 51 (2006). 
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matter for this purpose. The point is that there is no disconnect between 
good lawyers sharing the goals of their clients and social change agents 
sharing the goals of those they seek to benefit. 
The argument has been made that lawyers would effect greater social 
change if they concentrated their efforts outside the lawyer's traditional 
role.92 Cause lawyers use their "legal skills to pursue ends and ideals that 
transcend client service-be those ideals social, cultural, political, 
economic or, indeed, legal."93 The use of litigation as a chief means of 
effecting social change has been criticized for various reasons, perhaps 
most notably for its narrowing of options and focus for the social movement 
and for its tendency to produce co-opted members of the movement. 94 But 
in any event, whether more effective inside the traditional lawyer role or 
outside it, the law-trained have special talents for social change leadership. 
B. Three Examples: Gandhi, Nader, and Schlajly 
I am not suggesting that, because three famously effective social change 
agents were lawyers, lawyers are better suited to this role than nonlawyers. 
I could as easily have chosen three religious leaders and claimed that those 
three meant that religious leaders are better suited than others to perform 
this role. And perhaps they are, just as lawyers possess some role 
advantage. Perhaps it would be harder to find three engineers who were 
leaders of social movements. These three pieces of data would not make 
much of an empirical impression, I agree. My point in using these 
examples is to show the mesh between the skills and training and mindset 
of lawyers generally and the attributes of social change agents generally. 
These examples are meant as illustrations, not proof. 
1. Gandhi 
Gandhi briefly attended Samaldas College, located in the port city of 
Bhavnagar, but Gandhi was disappointed with Samaldas College and 
desired to travel to England for his education.95 Gandhi's father wished 
him to be a lawyer.96 
92. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 265, 338-43 (1991); Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical 
Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 
1850-1940, 3 REs. L. & Soc. 3 (1980); Karl E. Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a 
New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 450, 478 (1981); 
Elizabeth V. Mensch, The Colonial Origins of Liberal Property Rights, 31 BUFF. L. REv. 
635, 635-36 (1982). But see Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical 
Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REv. 937, 938, 940-41 
(2007). 
93. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, 
PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 3 (2004) (citing LUBAN, supra note 31 ). 
94. See Lobel, supra note 92. 
95. Stephen Hay, Between Two Worlds: Gandhi's First Impressions of British Culture, 
3 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 305,317 (1969). 
96. !d. at 312. 
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Disappointed with education in India, he focused on attaining his legal 
education in England. For practical reasons, Gandhi knew that practicing 
law in British-ruled India was "impossible without a knowledge of English" 
for the reason that the "codes of law, although translated into the main 
languages of India, were all in English."97 According to the interviewer, 
Gandhi also stated frankly, in an interview with The Vegetarian, that he had 
gone to England as a law student "due to ambition, the desire for status, and 
the hope of improving [my] economic position by joining a lucrative 
profession."98 Gandhi was driven to go to England for personal reasons as 
well. Gandhi thought to himself, "If I go to England not only shall I 
become a barrister (of whom I used to think a great deal), but I shall be able 
to see England, the land of philosophers and poets."99 
Gandhi's early petitions were not for independence, but for equal 
treatment of Indians as British subjects. In his autobiography, Gandhi 
wrote that the "colour prejudice that [he] saw in South Africa was ... quite 
contrary to British traditions," and that in those days he "believed that 
British rule was on the whole beneficial."100 It was not until some years 
later that Gandhi considered British rule in India as an evil, and eventually, 
Gandhi espoused a "total rejection of the West." 101 
On November 6, 1888 he joined the Inner Temple and later, in 1889, 
Gandhi decided to take the Matriculation Examination of the University of 
London as a private candidate. 102 Although the London Matriculation 
"meant a good deal of labour," Gandhi "wished to have the satisfaction of 
taking a difficult examination."I03 
Gandhi fulfilled the requirements of the Inner Temple, eating the 
requisite number of meals per term. But he did not eat meat or fish, and he 
was a much sought dinner companion: because he would not drink the 
wine, there was more for his fortunate dinner companions to enjoy.I04 
Gandhi "knew that Bar Examinations did not require much study."l05 The 
bar examination included two examinations, one in Roman Law and the 
other in Common Law.I06 Becoming a barrister could be achieved "by a 
short and relatively easy course of study, combined with a few formal 
appearances at one of the Inns of Court." 107 
Gandhi, however, took his studies seriously and actually "spent much 
money in buying the prescribed text books" rather than "cramming" like 
97. !d. 
98. CHANDRAN D. S. DEVANESEN, THEMAKINGOFTHEMAHATMA 147 (1969). 
99. Hay, supra note 95, at 311 (citing Gandhi's interview with The Vegetarian). 
100. MOHANDAS K. GANDHI, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OR THE STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS 
WITH TRUTH 142-43 (Mahadev Haribhai Desai trans., 1996) ( 1927). 
101. YOGESH CHADHA, GANDHI: A LIFE 160 (1997). 
102. J. M. UPADHYAYA, MAHATMA GANDHI AS A STUDENT 75-76 (1965). 
I 03. !d. at 76. 
104. !d. at 75-76. 
105. GANDHI, supra note 100, at 46. 
I 06. UPADHYA YA, supra note I 02, at 76. 
I 07. KATHRYN TIDRICK, GANDHI: A POLITICAL AND SPIRITUAL LIFE 2 (2006). 
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other students. 108 Gandhi prepared for the bar examinations by "working 
his way through the prescribed texts." 109 These texts included the Common 
Law of England, Snell's Equity, White and Tudor's Leading Cases, 
William and Edward's Real Property, and Goodeve's Personal Property.llO 
In these texts, Gandhi became acquainted with the law and "displayed ... a 
relish for arguing things out," and some of what he later claimed to be 
'"scientific' reasoning about ethical and religious matters owed more to the 
legal reasoning he encountered in such texts as Snell's Equity." 111 Gandhi 
passed the bar examination at the age of twenty-two and on June 10, 1891, 
was called to the bar and enrolled in the High Court on the 11 th. 112 He left 
for home the next day. 113 
During his stay in England, Gandhi was also influenced by social and 
economic changes. Gandhi came into contact with the Irish discontent, and 
he would apply "its lessons in India."' 14 Gandhi also came in close contact 
with the English poor and the labor movements, and Gandhi's "perception 
of the inequality of man [was] heightened by years spent in London." 11 5 As 
with many law students and lawyers, his perspective was broadened by the 
experience of his study. 
Gandhi, after leaving England, went to Bombay to begin his legal 
practice and to begin his study of Indian law. Unfortunately, Gandhi's 
studies of English and Roman law "had given him no . . . practical 
experience of the conduct of cases in court."i 16 His complaints with his 
legal education are less and less familiar today but ring in the ears of 
seasoned legal educators. Gandhi became overwhelmed at his first court 
appearance, and as a result, Gandhi returned the fee and told his client he 
could not continue the case. II? 
In 1893, Gandhi took a position in South Africa. Gandhi joined a firm 
representing Dada Abdulla & Co., shipowners and traders, in an ongoing 
lawsuit to collect on a promissory note totaling £40,000. 11 8 Gandhi wrote 
that the case was intricate and contained "numerous points of fact and law," 
and that "[b ]oth parties had engaged the best attorneys and counsel," from 
which he "had a fine opportunity of studying their work."' 19 
Gandhi's work in South Africa gave him "true knowledge of legal 
practice," and through his experience there, he "gained confidence that [he] 
108. UPADHYAYA,supra note 102, at 76. 
109. TIDRICK, supra note 107, at 4. 
II 0. UPADHYA YA, supra note I 02, at 78. 
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should not after all fail as a lawyer."120 After Gandhi joined the case, he 
"saw that the facts of Dada Abdulla's case made it very strong" and that 
"the law was bound to be on his side," but he also concluded that if 
litigation persisted then it would "ruin the plaintiff and the defendant."12l 
At that point, Gandhi advised that the case move for arbitration, which 
resulted in a settlement that "delighted" his client.122 
At the conclusion of this case, Gandhi received advice that he took to 
heart for the rest of his legal and social action career, particularly, that if 
one takes "care of the facts of a case, the law will take care of itself."123 
Gandhi, from that point on, would meticulously gather facts from which to 
present his arguments, inside and outside his lawyer's role. 
Throughout Gandhi's life, there are numerous instances where his legal 
education and lawyer's mindset or experience were essential to his role as a 
leader for social change. Gandhi pursued his goal of equal rights and 
independence as a lawyer pursues a client's interests. His work would 
follow the pattern of a lawyer presenting a client's case; particularly, 
Gandhi would research the facts and the law and then present those facts 
alongside arguments to the community, government officials, and 
organizations. This tie between his legal education and the sense of a 
lawyer representing a client's interests, and his work for Indian rights and 
independence is seen at the onset of his days in South Africa. 
The Indian population faced widespread racial discrimination in South 
Africa, and, during the years that Gandhi was living there, "numerous 
restrictions were placed on Indians."124 In the first few days of Gandhi's 
stay in South Africa, Gandhi came in close encounter with the inequities 
and prejudices against Indians. Once, 
he was thrown out from the first class railway compartment for which he 
had purchased a ticket; his baggage was dumped on the platform. A 
white passenger had him removed from the railway carriage because of 
the color of his skin. From that moment on, Gandhi vowed to combat 
discriminatory laws.125 
In the beginning, Gandhi, as recorded in his diary, was "merely a witness 
and a victim of these wrongs," and it was from this that he "awoke to a 
sense of [his] duty."126 Gandhi, however, "did nothing beyond talking on 
the subject with the Indians in Pretoria," because he decided that to "look 
after the firm's case and to take up the question of Indian grievances at the 
same time would be to ruin both."127 
120. !d. at 109. 
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Soon enough, however, he called a meeting of Indians and appealed to 
the people to form an "association to make representations to the authorities 
about the hardships suffered by the Indian settlers."128 He "offered to place 
at its disposal as much of his time and service as possible."129 Gandhi, on 
that day, "made a deep impression" among the Indians in South Africa, and 
as a result, he was "instrumental" in the founding of the Natal Indian 
Congress, from which he would "conduct his future struggle for Indian 
rights."l30 
From that moment on, Gandhi would continuously seek out redress for 
injustices done to the Indians in South Africa; he had "found a cause which 
absorbed him completely."l3 1 Gandhi did continue his legal practice, but 
he wanted his practice as a lawyer to remain a "subordinate occupation," as 
it was "necessary that [he] should concentrate on public work."132 
Gandhi's "approach to community work was that of a lawyer," in that he 
would take up a cause, do extensive research and fact gathering, then 
present his findings and arguments to the governments and the public as if 
presenting a case in the court of law. 133 
For instance, Gandhi's association with Indians in Pretoria led him to 
confront the "disability laws" in the Transvaai. 134 These laws, particularly 
the proposal for Indian disenfranchisement, gained Gandhi's immediate 
interest. Gandhi, in response, started a petition to the Natal Government, 
and he "took considerable pains over drawing up this petition."135 Gandhi 
"read all the literature available on the subject," and gathered specific 
instances of harm and other facts.I36 Gandhi intended to make a "careful, 
unbiased study."137 Gandhi spent weeks writing and his work resulted, in 
1896, in the Green Pamphlet, also known as The Grievances of the British 
Indians of South Africa, and originally over I 0,000 copies were printed and 
sent to newspapers and prominent Indians. 138 
Within the petition, Gandhi "argued that [the Indians] had a right to the 
franchise in Natal."l39 The "Green Pamphlet was in fact a summary of the 
several petitions, memorials, circulars and leaflets [Gandhi] had issued to 
the authorities in Natal, London and Calcutta," and it "detailed the 
sufferings of the Indians in Natal."I40 It included discussion and examples 
"on the injustice[s] of the pass system, the three-pound tax, restrictions in 
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the purchase of property, and other inequities."l41 Gandhi showed 
"impressive industry and great forensic skill as he marshaled all the facts of 
the Indian case."l42 The arguments within the pamphlet were received both 
positively and negatively, but were clear and well supported. As written in 
the Natal Mercury newspaper, the petition "ma[d]e a very good case from 
[the Indian's] point of view." 143 
Gandhi's legal education particularly prepared him for his work on the 
Green Pamphlet. He used his lawyering skills to gather the facts and to use 
those facts in reasoned arguments supporting his cause. In his 
autobiography, Gandhi even referred to his work on the Indian grievances 
in South Africa as a "case."l44 
Similarly, another cause that Gandhi took up was that of the indentured 
Indian laborers. In 1894, the Natal Government sought to impose an annual 
tax of £25 on the indentured Indians, and in response, Gandhi lead and 
"organized a fierce campaign against this tax."145 
Gandhi was not in all ways enamored with lawyers. He became 
disillusioned with the law system and the purpose and use of attorneys. 
Gandhi began to feel as if the Indians were "fighting a losing battle against 
a rising tide of racial prejudice," and he became weary of the law courts.146 
In his book Hind Swaraj, Gandhi said that lawyers are "glad when men 
have disputes," and even "manufacture them," and the "greatest injury" 
done by lawyers in South Africa and India is that "they have tightened the 
English grip." 147 Yet, if Gandhi had not been a lawyer himself, "his 
usefulness in Natal would have been severely limited," because his 
education and legal background "gave him status in the eyes of the whites" 
and prepared him for his cause.148 Eventually, Gandhi would give up his 
law practice to focus more on his community work. But he did that work as 
a lawyer would pursue a client's cause. 
Upon Gandhi's return to India, he would become central to India's 
movement for independence and to other social movements. Gandhi would 
push for a better and a free government as well as combating the "stinking 
dens" that were Indian cities and confronting the caste system and the 
wealthy who "extracted their wealth from the poor," and all the while 
Gandhi would condemn violence as a tool for freedom. 149 Throughout all 
of these struggles, Gandhi's legal education and experience gave him the 
skills to achieve change. 
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For instance, Gandhi attacked the system of indentured servitude while in 
India. Gandhi viewed the system as nothing more than a "system of 'semi-
slavery. '"150 It was this cause, in support of the tenants and the indigo 
planters in Champaran, that was Gandhi's "first conspicuous entry on to the 
political stage in India."151 In 1917, Gandhi traveled to Champaran to see 
the hardships faced by the indigo planters and to meet with the lawyers who 
commonly represented the peasants in court. 152 Again, Gandhi's 
disillusionment with the law became apparent after he and the indigo 
planters concluded that they "should stop going to law courts," because 
"[t]aking such cases to the courts does little good."l53 
As a result, Gandhi began a "fact-finding mission," in order to 
understand the plight of the peasants and to investigate the 
mistreatments. 154 Depositions by over ten thousand peasants were written 
down and notes made on other evidence, and Gandhi made sure that the 
evidence was sound by having every peasant "cross-examined."155 
In much the same manner, he pursued the interests of the "ryots 
[peasants]" 156 fighting the tinkathia (tenant-cultivation) system. 157 
And then as well, he pursued the interests of the textile workers in 
Ahmedabad. 158 Although Gandhi decided to pursue the mill workers' 
interests through civil disobedience and personal hunger, he again took to 
the cause of the mill workers in the best traditions of a lawyer pursuing a 
client's interests. Gandhi placed the interests of the mill workers above his 
own. Gandhi continued with the cause despite personal harm through 
hunger and the threats of imprisonment for causing civil unrest. Gandhi 
also pursued the mill workers' interests through multiple ways. Gandhi 
pushed for arbitration, urged the mill workers to strike, sent petitions to 
government officials, and finally, urged more civil disobedience. Gandhi 
kept the mill workers' goals in sight while also using all possible means to 
achieve those goals. 
Gandhi pursued Indian independence as a lawyer pursuing justice for a 
client. By this point, Gandhi's campaign included the presentation of 
injustice and arguments for relief. By the onset of his push for Indian 
independence, Gandhi's plan of noncooperation had "taken a definite 
shape," which was "a strategy whereby a systematic war would be waged 
against the government."l59 Gandhi first "proposed the return of 
decorations and honours awarded by the British, the withdrawal of children 
150. /d. at 218. 
151. /d. at 219. 
152. !d. at 219-20. 
153. !d. at 220 (internal quotations omitted). 
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and students from government-supported schools and colleges, the boycott 
of law courts by lawyers and litigants, and the boycott of elections to new 
legislative councils," and that "government officials would be asked to 
leave their offices, and soldiers would be called upon to lay down their 
arms," as well as a "massive refusal to pay taxes."160 Gandhi announced 
that this period of noncooperation would commence on August I, 1920.161 
Soon after, Gandhi persuaded the Congress in Calcutta to accept the policy 
of noncooperation with "self-rule as its goal" by using "peaceful and 
legitimate means."162 By this point, Gandhi was "touring the country 
extensively" and "addressing mammoth meetings."163 Gandhi also kept 
writing letters to the Viceroy demanding that the freedom of speech, 
freedom of association, and freedom of the press be restored as well as the 
release of innocent people from jail. 164 The campaign was that of a 
creative, problem-solving lawyer, pursuing multiple strategies on behalf of 
a client. 
2. Nader 
Ralph Nader was born in Winsted, Connecticut on February 27, 1934.165 
Civic awareness started at a young age for Nader. Even when he was still 
in grade school, his father "would institute discussions of current events, 
politics, and civic consciousness" with Nader and his siblings. 166 Nader 
attended Princeton University, and despite his professors' urgings that he 
pursue a Ph.D., upon graduation Nader enrolled in Harvard Law School to 
pursue his childhood dream of becoming a lawyer.167 
Nader felt that there was an "overall mental narrowness and moral 
complacency" about Harvard.l68 As opposed to the "model student" he had 
been at Princeton, at Harvard Nader developed a habit of cutting classes, 
"disappear[ing] for days at a time," and becoming "increasingly 
antisocial."l69 Although Nader may have been a less than ideal student 
while at Harvard, he did start to develop his keen interest in writing (and 
writing about social issues) as a member and editor of the Harvard Law 
School Record_l70 In the Record, a student newspaper, Nader wrote articles 
"criticizing capital punishment," an even more ambitious "6,000-word 
article about the plight of the Native Americans," and a still "longer article 
about Puerto Rico's commonwealth status." 171 Elected president of the 
160. ld. at 246-47. 
161. !d. at 248. 
162. ld. at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
163. !d. at 251. 
164. ld. at 257. 
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Record, Nader tried to push the Record to being a full investigative 
journal.172 Even though his effort to move the Record in his desired 
direction failed (leading Nader to resign his position), Nader continued to 
"write muckraking articles of shorter length."i73 
His time at Harvard did expose Nader to concepts and materials that 
would prove crucial to his early, post-J.D. social change career. Most 
critical for Nader was an article he read in the Harvard Law Review titled 
Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger 
Cars.I74 Nader pursued the topic while in law school and, during his last 
year, "auto safety became Nader's main course of study."175 Nader also 
developed a relationship with the dean emeritus of Harvard Law School, 
Roscoe Pound.176 Pound's legal realist approach to the law suited Nader 
well, and can be seen clearly in Nader's later work: "He brought in all 
kinds of data from all the social sciences. The law writ large, that was the 
province of Roscoe Pound .... "177 
For his first several years after law school, Nader pursued a range of 
endeavors.t78 Nader did a short stint as an army cook, traveled to Cuba 
where he attended a press conference given by Castro, "traveled to 
Scandinavia to learn more about ombudsmen," traveled to Russia and 
Africa, and lectured on government at the University of Hartford.179 
Throughout much of this time, Nader worked at the small law office of 
George Athanson on matters such as "divorces, trusts, bankruptcy, [and] 
personal injury."tso Nader's remarks about his experience at the Athanson 
law practice suggest the emphasis that Nader would later place on pursuing 
social causes where he could have a real demonstrable effect: "This was 
real people seeking genuine justice."181 Routine law practice. Nader's 
career continued in this somewhat haphazard manner until, in 1964, he 
received a call from Daniel Patrick Moynihan that would "signal[] a 
dramatic and propelling change of life" for Nader. 182 
Moynihan hired Nader at a rate of fifty dollars per day to write a report 
on the subject of auto safety. 183 Nader would eventually produce a 234-
172. !d. 
173. !d. 
174. !d.; see also Harold A. Katz, Comment, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for 
Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1956). 
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179. !d. 
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page report.184 Also in 1964, Nader signed an agreement to write a book on 
auto safety.185 This book would be published on November 30, 1965, 
under the title Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-In Dangers of the 
American Automobile.186 While Unsafe at Any Speed is best remembered 
for targeting and eviscerating the sales of the Chevrolet Corvair, most 
relevant here is the manner in which Nader approached this project as a 
lawyer might.187 He conducted both extensive original research and 
synthesized the work of others.188 As would be expected from a 
nontechnical lawyer writing a book on a technical subject, his synthesis 
focused on the work of auto safety specialists with greater technical 
expertise than his own.189 
Besides Nader's research and synthesis, the structure of Unsafe at Any 
Speed was strengthened by his training as a lawyer. In law school, Nader 
learned the rhetorical force of opening an argument with a particularly 
poignant example. In this case, Nader's first book opened by detailing the 
flaws of the Corvair: 
[W]ith the Corvair's center of gravity and high roll couple of the 
suspension, body lean becomes a considerable force acting to tuck both 
wheels under in a cornering attitude. This results in loss of adhesion 
because of lowered tire surface contact. The sudden breakaway which 
has been experienced by every Corvair driver comes when a slight 
irregularity in the surface destroys the small amount of adhesion 
remaining. I90 
Having grabbed the reader's attention, just as a good trial lawyer might, 
Nader proceeded to lay out his case in an organized fashion, with each 
chapter dealing with a discrete topic.191 One chapter dealt with pollution, 
one with the failures of the car engineers, another with the excessive 
emphasis the car industry placed on style, etc. 192 In closing Unsafe at Any 
Speed, Nader moved from these specific areas about the industry to a more 
holistic discussion of the problems with the nation's and the car industry's 
approach to safety overali. 193 Nader would have become familiar with this 
method of analysis (detailing the specifics and then synthesizing them into 
an overarching argument) in his legal training. Lastly, Nader concluded 
184. /d. at 16. 
185. MARTIN, supra note 176, at 41. 
186. /d. at 45. 
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with a call to move toward some specific proposals for a solution to the 
problem he had just described.194 
Nader expanded his focus from the auto industry to become a general 
consumer advocate over the course of the late 1960s and 1970s.195 In 1967 
Nader took on the meat packing industry,196 and, in 1968, the working 
conditions of coal rniners197 and the fishing industry.l98 Nader called for 
"safer natural gas pipelines" starting in 1966,199 he took on the poultry 
industry,200 and he testified before the Senate on various issues including 
"the dangers of X rays and how they were used differently for African 
Americans than for whites" because of the belief "that the extra dosage was 
required for X rays to penetrate darker skin."201 Nader did not leave the car 
industry behind, though: he called for investigating GM under antitrust 
laws, criticized the door catches of Rolls Royce,202 and at one point called 
the Volkswagen "the most hazardous car currently in use in significant 
numbers in the United States."203 He fought about the problems that faced 
ordinary people, as he had done in his immediate post-J.D. law practice. 
In addition to the role Nader's legal training played in the manner in 
which Nader crafted his arguments, that training also proved useful in 
organizing certain aspects of his movement, mobilizing young people to 
support his causes, and providing leadership to the varied consumer 
protection arenas that he entered. Among the best known of Nader's early 
activities is his leadership of "Nader's Raiders."204 Nader's Raiders were 
first created in 1968.205 Their first project would target the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) because of its perceived laxity in protecting consumers: 
"Ample evidence suggested that the FTC was extremely deferential to the 
corporations it was supposed to police."206 Nader himself was particularly 
critical of the FTC's conflicts of interest, remarking that "[t]he wolfs been 
hired by the sheep."207 In 1968, Nader's Raiders consisted of seven 
"student sleuths," who had the responsibility for doing extensive research 
into the FTC.208 
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While Nader's views may have been radical in some regards, the style of 
his approach to his consumer activism was not radical. Nader's Raiders 
exemplify this: 
[They were] a group of well-groomed, supremely educated, and altogether 
serious young people. They burned neither bras nor draft cards, certainly 
did not demonstrate, riot, loot, or worse. They didn't even smoke pot. 
Instead, they were in the midst of a meticulous investigation of a 
specialized government agency that had abdicated its responsibility to 
consumers. 209 
The group sounds a bit like a small, boutique law firm. Nader's Raiders 
would move on to other issues beyond the FTC in the years to come, 
including food safety, the mining industry, air pollution, deceptive 
advertising, corporate accountability, and occupational injury.2IO 
Nader used his legal training to form, motivate, and provide leadership to 
groups other than Nader's Raiders. Probably among the more unusual and 
better known of these groups are the "Maiden Muckrakers."211 This group 
was formed in 1969 after Nader spoke at Miss Porter's School in 
Connecticut, a "sedate" finishing school for teenage girls.212 Nader's 
speech motivated a group of recent graduates from the school and one of 
their teachers to spend the summer of 1969 investigating various aspects of 
the nursing home industry.213 The Maiden Muckrakers would ask 
questions such as '"Should people be making a profit taking care of frail or 
elderly people?"'214 In addition to the Maiden Muckrakers, Nader provided 
motivation and leadership to a fresh attack on GM dubbed "Campaign 
GM."215 The campaign was led by two Harvard law graduates, Geoffrey 
Cowan and Philip Moore. 21 6 In 1970 Nader held a press conference at 
which he announced that he supported the campaign, but that he would not 
be directly involved.217 Campaign GM sought to have GM include certain 
resolutions on the annual proxy statement sent to each shareholder.218 
When GM refused to do so, Campaign GM filed a complaint with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to force GM to include the 
resolutions, and eventually Campaign GM won a significant victory when 
the SEC ordered GM to include revised versions of some of the resolutions 
in the company's proxy statement.219 Throughout this period one sees that 
among Nader's most important qualities was his ability to provide 
leadership, motivation, and direction to a range of motivated groups. Nader 
209. !d. at 79-80. 
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provided the overall vision for these groups, while allowing other persons 
from different walks of life to take the lead on the groundwork. His legal 
training aided him in his endeavors to motivate others and to provide 
leadership and vision to these various projects. 
Nader not only motivated the groups that he personally led or was 
involved in, but also motivated others. Throughout the zenith of his 
popularity (the late 1960s and 1970s), Nader was making about $250,000 
annually from his speeches, current writings, and royalties.220 Nader 
funneled these funds into the various groups he had founded and causes he 
supported.m Along similar lines, in 1970, Nader settled an invasion of 
privacy suit against GM for $425,000, which he used to back "a new legal 
firm and labeled it the Public Interest Research Group."222 
Nader was not only successful at motivation and fundraising for his 
causes, but he was also a "marionette master when it came to the press. "223 
Among the reasons for this was that Nader effectively "cast himself as an 
indefatigable advocate, grave, selfless, working away while the innocent 
citizenry sleeps. "224 
Nader's success as a social change agent stems from many lessons he 
learned in law school. These include the way he constructed and organized 
his arguments, his ability to lead and to motivate others, and his skills at 
working and even manipulating the press. Also not to be discounted, in his 
legal training, Nader learned to think critically and approach different issues 
at the same time, and to handle different responsibilities at the same time as 
well. 
3. Schlafly 
Phyllis Schlafly's lawyer-connected social activism is a special and most 
interesting example because of the timing of her career. She was a social 
activist before studying law. But the effect of her law study can be seen in 
the changes in her tactics and success as a social activist. There is good 
reason to believe that training in the law enhanced her success. 
Phyllis Schlafly was born Phyllis Stewart on August 15, 1924, in St. 
Louis, Missouri.225 Directly after high school, Schlafly attended Maryville 
College with a four-year scholarship. 226 But, she found Maryville "not 
challenging enough"; therefore, she decided to attend Washington 
University in St. Louis, and, in order to pay for her education, she also 
worked full-time at a St. Louis Ordinance Plant.227 After graduating from 
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Washington University, Schlafly entered Radcliffe on a fellowship, and, in 
seven months, she completed a master's degree in political science.228 In 
1945, she went to work for a conservative think tank, which is now known 
as the American Enterprise Institute, and, a year later, she also assisted in 
the ousting of a New Deal Democrat from his St. Louis House of 
Representatives seat. 229 
Phyllis Stewart became Phyllis Schlafly in 1949 when she married Fred 
Schlafly, a Harvard-educated lawyer.230 The Schlaflys would have six 
children together, and Schlafly would one day comment that her marriage 
and her family are her "No. 1 career."231 In 1952, Schlafly ran for 
Congress, and although she won the Republican primary in St. Louis, she 
lost the general election.232 Over the next couple of years, Schlafly would 
become a "Republican activist of note," in that she was an Eisenhower 
delegate to the 1956 national convention, president of the Illinois 
Federation ofRepublican Women, prominent in Daughters of the American 
Revolution, and she also testified before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee against the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.233 Schlafly actively 
sought to tum the GOP to the right, and would publish books, articles, and 
editorials advocating conservative policies. For instance, Schlafly's A 
Choice Not an Echo, published in 1964, sold over three million copies.234 
In this book, Schlafly presented a conservative platform and devoted a part 
of it to "the ultraconservative Goldwater" as candidate for the GOP 
nomination for President.235 Despite achieving some measure of 
prominence, Phyllis Schalfly failed to advance her own political career. In 
1967, she ran unsuccessfully for the presidency of the National Federation 
of Republican Women, and in 1970, she also ran unsuccessfully for an 
Illinois congressional seat. 236 
In 1975, at the age of fifty-one, Phyllis Schlafly entered law school at 
Washington University.237 She took the standard first-year courses in 
Contracts, Property, Torts, and Constitutional Law, and in her second year, 
she won the prize as the best student in Administrative Law, and she 
graduated twenty-seventh in her class of 186.238 During her time in law 
school and afterward, Schlafly would become the "most prominent 
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opponent of modern feminism" and a "major spokesperson for a powerful 
conservative movement. "239 
Phyllis Schlafly's greatest success would be outside of campaign politics. 
Her work advocating social issues and her "pro-family" platform would 
lead to her greatest accomplishments. In 1967, she began publishing the 
Phyllis Schlafly Report in order to spread her views, and in 1975, she 
formed the Eagle Forum as a competitor to the National Federation of 
Republican Women.240 
Phyllis Schlafly would maintain her focus on the cold war, foreign 
relations, and weaponry until 1972, at which point Schlafly would become 
focused on sinking the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Until Schlafly 
entered the arena, the ERA seemed set to become incorporated into the U.S. 
Constitution. In 1970, the ERA passed the House 350 to 15 and again in 
1971 by a similar margin; then, in 1972, the Senate passed the ERA 84 to 
8.241 Three-quarters of the states also needed to approve the amendment, 
and this had to be done by March 22, 1979, in order to meet the seven-year 
deadline set by Congress. 242 By the end of 1972, twenty-two states had 
already ratified the ERA, and by 1973, thirty states had ratified the 
amendment.243 During this period, Phyllis Schlafly responded initially to 
the ERA with indifference, stating, "I'm not interested in [the] ERA," and 
that she "figured [the] ERA was something between innocuous and mildly 
helpful. "244 Her views on the ERA changed quickly in the early 1970s. 
She concluded, after reading the amendment, that the ERA would 
"encourage divorce, abortion, and homosexuality."245 But, by 1977, the 
ERA had already been ratified by thirty-five states, only three states short of 
the necessary total for ratification. 246 Therefore, Schlafly would have to 
line up thirteen states against the ERA in order to prevent the ratification. 
In October of 1972, Schlafly founded STOP ERA, which she organized 
hierarchically and assumed full control of decision making.247 In 1972, 
Schlafly also published What's Wrong with "Equal Rights" for Women.248 
Schlafly didn't hesitate; she presented her arguments against the ERA on 
TV, in debates, via direct mail, and through the Phyllis Schlafly Report.249 
After 1975, Schlafly also utilized the Eagle Forum Newsletter to vocalize 
her position.250 Schlafly viewed the ERA as "radical, unnecessary, and a 
threat to legal rights of women and the American family," and in response, 
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she "mobilized tens of thousands of women across the nation to block the 
proposed twenty-seventh amendment. "251 
During this period, especially during the time that Schlafly was in law 
school and directly after she graduated, her arguments took a decidedly 
"legal" tum. She presented arguments against the ERA that focused on 
court unpredictability. Her writing initiated action in those fearing the 
unpredictability of the courts' reaction to the ERA; particularly, she brought 
concerns that the ERA would allow homosexuals to marry, create a 
constitutional right to abortion, and would make women liable to the 
draft.252 By these "scare tactics," Schlafly tapped into a conservative base 
in America, but she was still very much the "underdog" until 1980.253 
Schlafly was taking on an amendment that had not only been popular, but 
supported by Congress and the President. Moreover, her supporters were 
not "establish[ ed]" and her movement consisted of people who were "less 
educated, older, religious, . . . traditionalist," and they were more 
conservative, like herself, than the Republican Party at the time. 254 
Schlafly's arguments against the ERA centered around "unforeseen 
consequences" that would occur when "activist courts began to interpret the 
amendment"; specifically, she made the point that there is '"no way for 
anyone to say positively how the [U.S.] Supreme Court will apply the ERA 
to conscription, combat duty, alimony, child support, wife support, divorce, 
homosexuality, public restrooms, separate gym classes and athletic teams, 
single sex education, sexual crimes, and prostitution. "'255 Not only did she 
present arguments about the consequences of the law, Schlafly also argued 
that the "amendment was also unnecessary," because of the protections 
afforded women in the Equal Pay Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act, and Title IX of the Education 
Amendments Act. 256 
By painting the ERA as antifamily, Schlafly connected to the 
conservative base that would eventually move the GOP to the right. 
Schlafly found, utilized and embodied a "grassroots reaction against 
feminism, legalized abortion, ERA, and the ban on prayer in school. "257 
Schlafly' s movement was successful. 258 After 1977, not a single state 
ratified the ERA for the reason that STOP ERA had "stoked enough 
opposition and kept enough people neutral so that casting a vote for the 
amendment in some states had become too hazardous to a legislator's 
251. CRITCHLOW, supra note 225, at 12. 
252. ARTHUR & BROESAMLE, supra note 228, at 273. 
253. !d. at 278. 
254. !d. 
255. CRITCHLOW, supra note 225, at 225 (quoting letter from Olive Spann to an Alabama 
State Legislator (Mar. I 0, 1975)). 
256. !d. at 225-26. 
257. !d. at 214. 
258. For a thorough discussion of the Equal Rights Amendment ratification process, 
emphasizing Phyllis Schlafly's role, see DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX 
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 63-80 { 1989). 
2009] LAWYER AS CATALYST OF SOCIAL CHANGE 1589 
political career."259 Then, in 1980, after years of Schlafly's "energetic 
lobbying," the GOP and its presidential nominee, Ronald Reagan, suddenly 
decided not to endorse the ERA.260 Reagan expressed a commitment to the 
conservative agenda espoused by Schlafly, which "assured him of the 
support of the newly mobilized Christian Right and traditionalist 
women."26I In 1980, Schlafly stated that "STOP ERA had become part of a 
larger pro-family movement" and that it was critical to Reagan's 
campaign. 262 
Although Schlafly never was able to succeed in a political career, after 
her victory with sinking the ERA, she remained active in presenting her 
political and social agenda. Schlafly focused on campaigns against freezing 
nuclear weapons, against pornography, against sex education, and against 
ferninism_263 She also waged campaigns against the liberal welfare state, 
bureaucracy, and judicial activism.264 For instance, in 1984, Schalfly 
opposed the Balanced Budget Amendment and the call for a federal 
constitutional convention, termed the "Con Con," proposed by the Reagan 
adrninistration.265 Schlafly wrote that the "Con Con [w]as playing Russian 
roulette with the U.S. Constitution," in that the convention would open up 
the Constitution to liberal changes, such as repealing the Second 
Amendment. 266 Schlafly organized a resistance, with the slogan "Can the 
Con Con," and she presented arguments, which sought to protect the 
Constitution and keep it off the bargaining table and out of the hands of the 
media, political factions, and special interest groups.267 She targeted the 
last four remaining states and published articles, held debates, and 
approached officials, and as a result, the convention resolution was defeated 
by 1988.268 Recently, Schlafly has entered campaigns in Massachusetts 
after the Massachusetts Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriages and in 
2004 she published a book to rally a grassroots campaign against judicial 
activism. 269 
Schlafly's success as a social activist is not only attributable to her legal 
education. Before entering law school, Schlafly had attained a master's 
degree in political science, had been active in politics, and had already 
published books and articles. 270 But, her career in social and political 
activism took off about the time of her entrance into law school. Moreover, 
her arguments against the ERA and the Con Con focused on judicial 
259. ARTHUR & BROESAMLE, supra note 228, at 279. 
260. !d. at 278. 
261. CRITCHLOW, supra note 225, at 265. 
262. !d. at 267. 
263. ARTHUR & BROESAMLE, supra note 228, at 279-80. 
264. CRITCHLOW, supra note 225, at 13. 
265. !d. at 283-84. 
266. !d. 
267. !d. at 284. 
268. !d. at 284-85. 
269. !d. at 300-0 I. 
270. See supra notes 221-35 and accompanying text. 
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activism and threats to the Constitution and legal rights. Her legal 
education contributed to her ability to not only begin a social movement, 
but also to present clear legal and constitutional arguments against the 
ERA. 
CONCLUSION 
Among the roles to be usefully served in modern democracies, lawyers 
can effectively be agents of social change. The mindset of client 
representation lends itself to organizing and advocating for a cause despite 
suggestions that the cause is not in the public interest. The talents 
commonly displayed by lawyers and their training place the law-trained at a 
comparative advantage for leadership roles in social change movements. 
